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Critics of international student comparisons argue that results may be influenced by 
differences in the extent to which countries adequately sample their entire student 
populations. In this research note, we show that larger exclusion and non-response rates are 
related to better country average scores on international tests, as are larger enrollment rates for 
the relevant age group. However, accounting for sample selectivity does not alter existing 
research findings that tested academic achievement can account for a majority of international 
differences in economic growth and that institutional features of school systems have 
important effects on international differences in student achievement. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic research has made increasing use of international student achievement data,
1 but 
critics suggest that underlying sampling issues might compromise any comparability across 
countries.  Non-random differences in patterns of school enrollment, sample exclusions, and 
non-response are clearly able to influence rankings of countries on international league tables of 
average student achievement.  The extent, however, to which such sample selection also affects 
results of analyses that use the international test score data is currently unknown.  This research 
note draws on detailed information on sampling quality to estimate whether international 
differences in sample selection affect the outcomes of typical economic analyses. 
We find that countries having more schools and students excluded from the targeted sample, 
having schools and students who are less likely to participate in the test, and having higher 
overall school enrollment at the relevant age level tend to perform better on the international 
tests.  However, none of these sampling patterns affect the results of typical growth regressions 
and education production functions, implying that they are unrelated to the associations of 
interest in economic analyses. 
In the political debate, poor performance on international achievement tests famously 
motivated the National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) to declare the United 
States “A Nation at Risk”.  Others have suggested, however, that this is a myth created by biased 
samples in other countries (Berliner and Biddle (1995)).  To such critics, “The basic problem is 
student selectivity:  The fewer the students who take the test, the higher the average score.  That 
score … simply reflects the fact that the students represented in the test comparisons have been 
much more highly selected in some countries than in others” (Rotberg (1995), p. 1446; see also 
Bracey (1996); Prais (2003)).
2  But others disagree with the view that sample selection is a major 
source of bias in international achievement comparisons (e.g., Baker (1997); Adams (2003)). 
                                                 
1 See Hanushek and Woessmann (forthcoming) for a review of the extensive economic literature on 
international educational achievement.  Studies using international test score data as determinants of economic 
growth include Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Barro (2001), Bosworth and Collins (2003), Ciccone and Papaioannou 
(2009), and Hanushek and Woessmann (2008, 2009).  Studies using international test score data as outcomes of 
education production functions include Bishop (1997), Lee and Barro (2001), Woessmann (2003), Bedard and 
Dhuey (2006), Brunello and Checchi (2007), Guiso, Monte, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), Ammermueller and 
Pischke (2009), and West and Woessmann (forthcoming). 
2 The tests included in our analyses have been devised in an international cooperative process between all 
participating countries with the intent of making the assessments independent of the culture or curriculum in any 
particular country.  Yet, another criticism that is sometimes raised against international comparisons of student   2
Simple calculations indicate that in fact sampling bias certainly has the potential to move 
country mean test scores substantially.  For example, if the exclusion propensity and student 
achievement are bivariate normally distributed and correlated at 0.5, exclusion rates of 10 
percent – not uncommon in some countries – lead to an upward bias in the resulting country 
mean score of 10 percent of a standard deviation (see Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (2007)).
3  Of course, the extent to which exclusion and performance are 
correlated is unknown.  If exclusion is random, it does not bias results at all.  But the calculation 
suggests that differential sampling quality may well affect overall country rankings despite the 
stringent technical standards and extensive efforts of quality assurance by the international 
testing organizations (e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009)). 
The basic notion of measurement error in econometric analyses tells us that it is another 
matter whether and how such mismeasurement of country mean performance biases results of 
econometric analyses of relationships.  First, any bias depends on whether sample selectivity is 
idiosyncratic or persistent over time – i.e., whether some countries have systematically more 
selective samples than others or not.  If it is idiosyncratic, sample selectivity introduces classical 
measurement error that works against finding statistically significant associations:  It attenuates 
the estimated coefficient on test scores for errors in an explanatory variable and reduces 
statistical power, increasing standard errors, for errors in the dependent variable.  But, in 
applications that use averages of performance across several tests (as in most economic growth 
applications), the importance of any idiosyncratic measurement error will be lessened since the 
error variance is reduced by averaging.  When sample selectivity is persistent across time, the 
second issue is whether it is correlated with the error term of the estimation equation.  If it is 
orthogonal to the (conditional) variable whose association with test scores is of interest, even 
systematic sample selectivity simply works against finding statistically significant results.  Only 
                                                                                                                                                               
achievement is that test items may be culturally biased or inappropriate for specific participating countries (e.g., 
Hopmann, Brinek, and Retzl (2007)).  Adams, Berezner, and Jakubowski (2010) show that overall country rankings 
are remarkably consistent when countries are compared using just those PISA-2006 items that representatives of 
each specific country had initially expressed to be of highest priority for inclusion, and presumably most appropriate 
for their own school system.   From the opposite perspective, one set international comparison (not employed here) 
was built on tests directly taken from the assessments used in the United States, but the results from these 
comparisons did not alter the low ranking of U.S. students (see Lapointe, Mead, and Phillips (1989)). 
3 This statement refers to standard deviations at the student level.  While varying across specific tests, this is 
roughly equivalent to twice the standard deviation in country mean scores.    3
if it is correlated with the error term of the equation of interest does systematic sample selectivity 
introduce bias to econometric analyses.
4 
The next section investigates the correlation of sample selectivity with test scores.  The 
subsequent sections provide evidence whether accounting for sample selectivity affects results of 
typical growth regressions and international education production functions, respectively. 
2.  Sample Selection and Average Test Scores 
2.1  The Three Sources of Sample Selection in International Tests 
It is useful to distinguish three main sources of discrepancies between the sample of students 
tested in a country and its total population of children at the age of interest.  First, testing is 
always focused on students in school.  Part of the children in the tested age range may no longer 
be in school, which eliminates them from the official target population of the international tests.  
This first problem is not associated with the testing so much as with the character of schooling in 
each country.  Second, to a limited extent, national testing authorities are allowed to exclude 
certain schools and students from their national target population, mostly excluding small remote 
schools, schools serving students with disabilities, and individual students with disabilities or 
limited proficiency in the test language.  Third, once the national sampling frame is set, non-
responses may reduce the testing of students.  Some of the sampled schools may not participate 
in the test, and some of the sampled students may be absent on the testing day.  We will 
separately deal with each of these sources of sample selectivity, because each may have very 
different impacts on the validity of the testing and the importance of statistical bias. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the five international tests in mathematics and science 
conducted at the lower secondary level between 1995 and 2003.  For consistency with the most 
recent economic growth research, we do not consider tests beyond 2003.  We further restrict 
attention to tests in math and science, which are most readily comparable across countries.   
While documentation on the quality of sampling is mostly missing on the early international 
student achievement tests, since the mid-1990s the organizations responsible for the major 
international testing cycles – the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
                                                 
4 Studies such as Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) that include country fixed effects deal with possible bias 
from systematic sampling errors by removing time-invariant factors for each country.   4
Achievement (IEA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
– provide detailed documentation of the extent to which each participating country covered the 
underlying student population in its sampling.  In 1995, 1999, and 2003, the IEA conducted the 
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), whose common target 
population is students enrolled in the upper of the two adjacent grades that contain the largest 
proportion of 13-year-old students.  In 2000 and 2003, the OECD conducted the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), whose target population is 15-year-old students. 
Both tests allow exclusions for small geographically remote schools, for schools focused on 
students with intellectual or functional disabilities, and for individual students in the latter group 
within schools.  Excluding students from the target sample is generally permissible for students 
who are unable to follow the general instruction of the test, but not simply because of poor 
academic performance or normal disciplinary problems.  To limit such exclusions, the tests 
generally require participating countries to keep exclusion rates below 5 percent (see Mullis, 
Martin, Gonzalez, and Chrostowski (2004) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2004) for details). 
Sampled schools in many nations are not required to participate.  Moreover, individual 
students may be absent on the day of the assessment.  Again, to limit the extent of such non-
participation, response rates are generally deemed acceptable only if they reach 85 percent both 
at the school level and at the student level (80 percent at the student level in PISA).  Substantial 
breaches of these sampling requirements led the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to be 
excluded from PISA reporting in 2000 and 2003, respectively, and several countries to be 
annotated as not meeting sampling guidelines in the TIMSS results tables. 
Given the nature of the permissible exclusions – small, remote schools and students with 
special needs or language deficiencies – higher exclusion rates are likely to introduce positive 
selection bias into estimates of national mean performance.  The direction of selection bias is not 
as obvious for non-response rates, but if weaker performing schools and students are less likely 
to participate in the test, it would go in the same direction as for exclusion rates. 
Even less clear is the direction of bias for enrollment rates in tested ages.  Given our focus 
on tests in lower secondary school, virtually all developed countries have close to universal 
enrollment.  As a consequence, sampling differences mostly come into play when comparing 
developed to less-developed countries.  It is generally the case that students with higher ability or   5
other background features supportive of higher achievement are more likely to be enrolled in 
school, introducing bias similar to exclusion rates.  But at the country level, this bias is likely to 
be overwhelmed by the fact that low enrollment rates in lower secondary education are a sign for 
a generally underdeveloped or dysfunctional education system.  On net, both biases are likely to 
be at work, giving rise to the possibility of a positive association between enrollment rates and 
test performance. 
The first two columns of Table 1 report descriptive statistics of the data on sample coverage 
for the 196 country observations on the five international tests.
5  Average school enrollment at 
testing age is 91.8 percent.  With the exceptions of Mexico and Turkey, though, all OECD 
countries come close to universal enrollment at the age range of the underlying tests.  Other 
countries with relatively low enrollment rates include Albania, Brazil, Ghana, Macedonia, 
Morocco, and Peru.  The average exclusion rate (from elimination of schools by the central 
testing authorities) is 3.1 percent.  The exclusion rate is higher than 10 percent on three occasions 
– Israel in TIMSS 1999 and 2003 (16 and 22.5 percent) and Macedonia in TIMSS 2003 (12.5).  
On an additional nine occasions exclusion rates fall between 7 and 10 percent, covering nine 
different countries and all five tests (except TIMSS 1999).  The average non-response rate, 
which arises at the school level, is 11.6 percent.  The non-response is higher than 30 percent on 
eight occasions:  Israel in TIMSS 1995 (54.9 percent), the United States in PISA 2000 and 2003 
(40.2 and 43.6), the United Kingdom in PISA 2000 and TIMSS 2003 (33.4 and 39), and the 
Netherlands (40.2), South Africa (37.9), and Bulgaria (36.4) in TIMSS 1995. 
2.2  The Correlation of Sample Coverage with National Mean Test Scores 
Table 1 (column 3) also reports the correlations of the components of sample selection with 
reported mean test performance of countries across the five international tests.  The correlations 
reveal that exclusion rates and non-response rates are as expected significantly positively 
associated with reported test scores:  The larger the share of schools and students excluded by the 
                                                 
5 The sources for the data on population coverage and participation rates in the different TIMSS and PISA tests 
are Beaton et al. (1996), Mullis et al. (2000), Mullis, Martin, Gonzalez, and Chrostowski (2004), and Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2003, 2004).  Because the TIMSS tests did not report school 
enrollment rates, we draw on data on gross enrollment rates in lower secondary education available from the World 
Bank (2010) to measure enrollment rates relevant for the TIMSS tests in countries where we do not have enrollment 
information from PISA.  We predict comparable enrollment rates for countries not participating in PISA based on a 
regression of enrollment rates reported by PISA on the gross enrollment rates (capped at full enrollment) for the 37 
countries with both measures available.   6
national testing authority and the larger the share of schools and students sampled but not 
participating, the higher the reported country mean test score.
6  At the same time, enrollment 
rates are also positively correlated with test scores, suggesting that there is no simple upward 
bias in the test scores of countries where a substantial share of the age group is not enrolled in 
school.
7 
These overall results are quite robust.  The significant correlation of the three measures of 
sample coverage with test scores is robust to controlling for fixed effects for the five underlying 
tests.  The reported correlations are similar when test scores in math and science are used 
separately.  Looking at correlations within each of the five international tests, enrollment rates 
are always positively significantly correlated with test scores.  Correlations with exclusion rates 
are significant in PISA 2003, marginally significant in PISA 2000 and TIMSS 2003, and not 
otherwise.  Correlations with non-response rates are significant in the PISA tests but not in the 
TIMSS tests.
8  As the last two columns of Table 1 show, exclusion rates and non-response rates 
are significantly correlated with enrollment rates but not with each other.  When all three are 
entered in a regression to predict test scores, only enrollment rates remain significant. 
To test whether some countries systematically sample smaller shares of the population than 
others, Table 2 reports correlations of exclusion rates and non-response rates across tests.  (Of 
course, enrollment rates are relatively constant over the short time period and are not reported in 
the table).
9  Non-response rates are positively correlated across the five tests.  By contrast, 
exclusion rates are significantly correlated in only three of the ten pairs of tests.  Thus, sample 
selectivity is only to a limited degree systematic over time and has a substantial idiosyncratic 
component, particularly in terms of exclusion decisions made by national testing authorities. 
                                                 
6 When subdividing exclusion and non-response rates into a school-level and a within-school student-level 
component each, both components of the non-response rate are positively correlated with test scores, whereas only 
the student-level component of the exclusion rate is significantly correlated with test scores. 
7 Combining exclusion and non-response rates into one non-participation rate per country also yields a positive 
correlation with test scores.  Combining all three measures of sample coverage into one measure of total non-
participation yields a negative correlation with test scores, i.e., the total is dominated by the negative correlation of 
non-enrollment with test scores. 
8 In PISA 2003, subcategories of student exclusions are reported for students with functional disability, 
intellectual disability, limited assessment language proficiency, and other.  Exclusions due to functional disability 
are most closely correlated with test scores, exclusions due to intellectual disability and limited language proficiency 
only in some subjects, and the residual other category not. 
9 Note, however, that Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) find that changes in enrollment rates of over longer 
periods of time are uncorrelated with trends in test scores.   7
3.  Sample Selection and the Results of Growth Regressions 
Economists have focused on two uses of international test scores:  modeling cross-country 
growth differences and modeling how educational institutions affect student achievement (see 
Hanushek and Woessmann (forthcoming)).  It is possible to illustrate the impact of sample 
selection on results in both areas by introducing measures of test participation rates into 
representative published models of each type.  In this section, we analyze the effect of potentially 
biased testing on the analysis of long-term economic growth. 
We employ the basic growth regression framework of Hanushek and Woessmann (2008), 
where the average annual growth rate in real GDP per capita over 1960-2000 is expressed as a 
function of initial GDP per capita, initial years of schooling, and a test score measure that 
combines performance on all international student achievement tests from primary through upper 
secondary school between 1964 and 2003.  The first column of Table 3 replicates the basic 
model of Hanushek and Woessmann (2008).  The second column reports the same model for the 
sample of 45 countries for which we have information on sampling quality.  Test scores have a 
significant positive effect on economic growth, with a one standard deviation increase in test 
scores associated with 1.74-1.98 percentage points of additional average annual growth.
10 
Column (3) adds our three measures of sample coverage – enrollment, exclusion, and non-
response rates – to the growth model.  They enter statistically insignificantly, individually or 
jointly, and do not significantly affect the coefficient on test scores.  That is, the variation in the 
extent to which sampling is selective across countries is orthogonal to the variation in conditional 
economic growth.  Thus, the positive association between test scores and economic growth 
cannot be explained by international differences in sample selectivity.
11 
                                                 
10 Concerns about identification of causal impacts frequently arise in such growth models.  While not 
conclusive, instrumental-variable, first-differenced, and differences-in-differences models are developed in 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) to rule out commonly hypothesized threats to the identification of causal effects 
of test scores on economic growth. 
11 The same results hold if exclusion rates and non-response rates are summed up to a joint non-participation 
measure, and if all three measures of sample coverage are combined into a measure of total non-participation.  When 
entering measures of school-level and within-school student-level non-response separately, neither enters 
significantly or affects qualitative results.  When entering measures of school-level and within-school exclusions 
separately, school-level exclusions tend to enter marginally significantly negatively, without affecting the coefficient 
on test scores.  None of the exclusion subcategories available in PISA 2003 – functional disability, intellectual 
disability, limited language proficiency, and other – captures statistical significance or affects the test score result.  
Controlling for limited coverage of national populations due to exclusion of certain regions or non-test-language 
schools from the national desired population, as is the case in a few countries in the TIMSS tests, also does not 
affect the qualitative results.   8
To this point, the test score measure refers to all international achievement tests, whereas 
our sampling information refers only to the five international tests conducted since 1995.  In 
column (4), we therefore use a test score measure created from just the five tests at the lower 
secondary level in 1995-2003 for which we have sampling information.  While the point estimate 
on this test score measure is slightly (but not significantly) smaller – presumably because of 
attenuation when using a measure based on fewer test information – qualitative results on the 
effect of including sampling information are the same.
12 
To ensure that the latter specification does not just capture test score variation that emerged 
towards the end (1995-2003) of the growth period of our analysis (1960-2000), column (5) uses 
the average test score of all international tests (1964-2003) as an instrument for the recent tests.  
Qualitative results are unchanged in this two-stage least-squares regression.  In column (6), we 
restrict the analysis to only that part of the variation in recent test scores that is related to test 
score variation on the early tests (1964-1985), ensuring that only test score variation that can be 
traced back to the early tests is used in the analysis.  While this reduces the sample to the 20 
countries that participated in the early tests, the qualitative result on the effect of test scores on 
economic growth is unaffected.  The same is true if we use only growth rates from 1980-2000 in 
this final specification (coefficient on test score equals 1.707).  This final specification uses only 
test score variation in the identification that mostly pre-dates the growth rates while at the same 
time using only variation related to tests for which we have the relevant sampling information as 
control variables. 
In additional analyses, we tested whether results are affected by how often countries 
participated in international tests, which might be another source of differential reliability of 
international test information across countries.  Qualitative results are unaffected by controlling 
for how often countries participated and for indicators of participation in early or recent tests, by 
looking at sub-samples of countries participating fewer than or at least five times and 
participating in the early tests or not, and by weighting regressions by the number of test 
participations per country.
13 
                                                 
12 Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) present extensive sensitivity tests on the use of varying specifications, 
different assessments of performance, and different time periods for tests and growth.   
13 Detailed results are available from the authors on request.   9
4.  Sample Selection and the Results of Education Production Functions  
A second use of international test data is focused on how institutional features of national 
school systems affect student outcomes, a central question in the analysis of educational 
production functions using international data.  This estimation has systematically found that 
institutional features of school systems capturing choice, accountability, and autonomy account 
for a substantial part of the cross-country variation in student achievement, whereas measures of 
school resources generally do not (see Hanushek and Woessmann (forthcoming) for a review).  
In this context, sample selectivity may be a particular issue.  For example, evidence from Florida 
suggests that schools may respond to high-stakes test-based school accountability by excluding 
low-performing students from counting on the accountability test through reclassifying them as 
disabled (Figlio and Getzler (2006)).  On the other hand, the tests that provide the internationally 
comparable achievement data are not the tests underlying the accountability systems, mitigating 
worries that incentives for sample selection affect the international testing. 
The first column of Table 4 replicates a basic set of estimates of international education 
production functions based on Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz, and West (2009)).  These 
estimates employ PISA-2003 math data at the student level and pool all OECD countries with 
available data.  Apart from the institutional measures reported here – two measures of choice, six 
measures of accountability, and four measures of autonomy and their interaction with external 
exit exams – the model includes 15 student control variables such as age, gender, and immigrant 
status; 17 family-background controls such as family status, parental occupation, and the number 
of books at home; and 10 school-input controls such as educational expenditure, class size, 
shortage of materials, and teacher education (not shown here).  The main pattern of results on the 
institutional effects is a positive association of student achievement with the share of privately 
operated schools, government funding, external exit exams, and school-level accountability 
measures.  Several school-level measures of school autonomy are negatively related to 
achievement in systems without accountability, but positively in those with accountability. 
Column (2) adds our three measures of sample coverage.  Enrollment, exclusion, and non-
response rates are jointly insignificant, and the pattern of results remains unaffected.
14  Again, 
                                                 
14 The non-response rate is actually marginally significant, but negative, i.e., countries with higher non-
response rates perform worse, rather than better, after controlling for the components of the production function.  
Analyses using the school-level and within-school student-level components of exclusion and non-response rates   10
the results suggest that sample selectivity is orthogonal to the associations of interest in 
international education production functions and thus does not affect their results. 
In line with the results reported above, column (3) shows that enrollment rates are in fact 
positively related to student achievement in PISA 2003 as long as the components of the 
production function are not controlled for.  (Exclusion rates and non-response rates are not 
significantly related to test scores in this OECD country sample, also when entered individually.)  
However, as column (4) shows, this association is driven solely by the two countries with 
enrollment rates below 90 percent (Mexico and Turkey).   
5. Conclusions 
Enrollment, exclusion, and non-response rates are positively correlated with reported 
country mean scores on international student achievement tests.  But the sample selectivity 
indicated by these measures does not affect the results of typical research on economic growth 
and educational production.  The international variation in selectivity of student samples is 
orthogonal to the associations of interest in these economic literatures. 
                                                                                                                                                               
separately reveal that the negative coefficient on the non-response rate is solely due to its school-level component.  
Qualitative results remain unaffected when including the components separately.  Combined versions of the three 
sample coverage measures do not enter the model significantly and do not affect the main results about the 
importance of institutional features.   11
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 Table 1:  Sample coverage – descriptive statistics and correlation with test scores  
 Mean  Min  Correlation  with 
Source of sample   (Std. dev.)  Max  Test score  Enrollment rate  Exclusion rate 
selection  problems  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Enrollment rate  91.8  42.7  0.571
*** 1.000   
 (11.3)  103.0  (0.000)    
Exclusion rate  3.1  0.0  0.133
* 0.127
* 1.000 
 (2.8)  22.5  (0.063) (0.076)   
Non-response rate  11.6  0.0  0.198
*** 0.207
*** 0.097 
  (9.4)  54.9  (0.005) (0.004) (0.177) 
Notes: 196 country-level observations:  all participants in the five international tests (TIMSS 1995, 1999, 2003; 
PISA 2000, 2003).  Test score is average of math and science on the Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) comparable 
scale.  Correlations:  p-values in parentheses.  Significance level:  
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent,
 * 10 percent. 
Table 2:  Sample coverage – correlation across tests 
  Exclusion rate  Non-response rate 
 TIMSS  PISA  TIMSS  PISA 
  1995 1999 2003 2000  1995 1999 2003 2000 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
TIMSS 1999  0.132        0.514
***      
  (0.519)      (0.007)     
TIMSS 2003  -0.036  0.670
***     0.336  0.790
***    
  (0.866) (0.000)      (0.100) (0.000)     




  (0.163) (0.263) (0.862)    (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)   







  (0.856) (0.021) (0.257) (0.023)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes:  Columns (1)-(4):  correlations among exclusion rates across tests.  Columns (5)-(8):  correlations among 
non-response rates across tests.  p-values in parentheses.  Significance level:  
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent,
 * 10 percent.  
Table 3:  Sample coverage and the role of test scores in growth regressions 





ted by AA 
LR instrumen-
ted by tests 
before 1985 
   (1)  (2)
a (3)  (4)  (5)
b  (6)
b 







 (0.217)  (0.228)  (0.278)  (0.214) (0.227) (0.429) 
Years of schooling 1960  0.026  0.041  0.028  0.068  0.060  0.114 
 (0.078)  (0.074)  (0.079)  (0.074) (0.075) (0.111) 







 (0.055)  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.052) (0.052) (0.085) 
Enrollment rate      0.009  0.011  0.010  -0.007 
     (0.011) (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.041) 
Exclusion rate      -0.055  -0.050  -0.049  -0.019 
     (0.058) (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.075) 
Non-response rate      0.016  0.012  0.013  0.003 




***    -2.954
*** -3.071
*** -2.741 
 (0.855)  (0.863)  (0.962)  (0.818) (0.832) (2.996) 
No. of countries  50  45  45  45  45  20 
R
2 (adj.)  0.728  0.685  0.680  0.689  0.688  0.777 
F-test (3 coverage rates)      0.79  0.74  0.68  0.03 
p-value     (0.505)  (0.533)  (0.571)  (0.993) 
F-test (instr. in 1
st stage)          311.92  32.14 
Notes:  Dependent variable:  average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1960-2000.  Test score is average of 
math and science.  See Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) for details on the basic specification.  AA = all grades, all 




 * 10 percent. 
a.  Sample of countries with available information on measures of sample coverage. 
b.  Two-stage least-squares regression. 
  
Table 4:  Sample coverage and institutional effects in education production functions 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)
a 
Share of privately operated schools  57.585
***  56.610
***    
 (8.355)  (9.239)     
Share of government funding  81.839
***  81.677
***    
 (22.327)  (25.595)     
External exit exams (EEE)  25.338
* 21.625
**    
 (10.054)  (10.283)     
Assessments used for retention/promotion  12.185
*** 12.430
***    
 (1.631)  (1.663)     
Internal monitoring of teacher lessons   4.557
*** 5.601
***    
 (1.343)  (1.391)     
External monitoring of teacher lessons   3.796
*** 3.793
***    
 (1.415)  (1.416)     
Assessments used for external comparisons  2.134
* 3.172
**    
 (1.259)  (1.291)     
Assessments used to group students  -6.065
*** -5.344
***    
 (1.301)  (1.325)     
Autonomy in formulating budget  -9.609
*** -10.332
***    
 (2.178)  (2.215)     
EEE x Autonomy in formulating budget  9.143
*** 8.746
***    
 (3.119)  (3.154)     
Autonomy in establishing starting salaries  -8.632
*** -5.478
*    
 (3.251)  (3.280)     
EEE x Autonomy in establishing starting salaries  5.868 3.810     
 (3.980)  (3.988)     
Autonomy in determining course content  0.175 0.669     
 (1.907)  (1.915)     
EEE x Autonomy in determining course content  3.224 3.405     
 (2.858)  (2.876)     
Autonomy in hiring teachers  20.659
*** 20.896
***    
 (2.249)  (2.299)     
EEE x Autonomy in hiring teachers  -28.935
*** -27.005
***    
 (3.365)  (3.425)     
Enrollment rate    0.143  2.424
*** 1.900 
 (0.300)  (0.382)  (1.751) 
Exclusion rate    0.577  -3.225  -2.459 
 (.300)  (2.091)  (2.094) 
Non-response rate    -0.523
* 0.291  0.262 
   (0.302)  (0.440)  (0.437) 
Students  219,794 219,794 219,794 184,956 
Schools  8,245 8,245 8,245 6,962 
Countries  29 29 29 27 
R
2    0.390 0.391 0.070 0.005 
F-test (3 coverage rates)    0.98  14.42  0.87 
  p-value   0.419  0.000  0.470 
Notes:  Dependent variable:  PISA 2003 international mathematics test score.  Sample:  OECD countries.  Least-
squares regressions weighted by students’ sampling probability.  The models additionally control for 15 variables of 
student characteristics, 17 variables of family background, 10 variables of school inputs, imputation dummies, and 
interaction terms between imputation dummies and the variables.  See Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz, and West 
(2009) and Hanushek and Woessmann (forthcoming) for details on the basic specification.  Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the school level in parentheses (clustering at country level for all country-level variables, 
which here are private operation, government funding, external exit exams, and the three measures of sample 
coverage).  Significance level (based on clustering-robust standard errors):  
*** 1 percent, 
** 5 percent,
 * 10 percent. 
a.  Sample of countries with enrollment rates of at least than 90 percent (excludes Mexico and Turkey).  CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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